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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 16, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as 
may be heard in the courtroom of the Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, Plaintiffs Patrick Kenny, Jennifer 
Patrick, Dao Phong, Daniel Pipkin, Ryan McKeen, Leron Levy, Luke Szulczewski, Michael Allan, 
Gary Cribbs, Bobby Cline, Shawn Grisham, Mark Laning, Clarissa Portales, Eric Thomas, Douglas 
White, Brian Sandstrom, and Colleen Fischer will and hereby do move the Court, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), for an order: 
1. Preliminarily approving the Settlement they have reached on a nationwide basis 
with all Defendants in this matter; 
2. Granting provisional certification of the Settlement Class, and appointing the 
foregoing Named Plaintiffs as class representatives and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and 
Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP as Class Counsel; 
3. Approving the Parties’ proposed Notice Program, as set forth in the Settlement 
Agreement, and directing notice of the proposed Settlement to the Settlement Class;  
4. Appointing Gilardi & Co. LLC (“Gilardi”) as the Settlement Administrator, and 
directing Gilardi to carry out the duties of the Settlement Administrator, including but not limited 
to the provision of notice, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement;  
5. Approving the Parties’ proposed Claim Form, and approving the procedures set 
forth in the Settlement Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from 
the Settlement Class, and object to the Settlement; 
6. Setting a schedule for the final approval process and for Plaintiffs’ motion for 
service awards to Named Plaintiffs (and one former Named Plaintiff) and attorneys’ fees and costs; 
and 
7. Staying all non-settlement-related proceedings in the this case pending final 
approval of the proposed Settlement. 
The grounds for this motion are that the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and 
reasonable, and that the other requested relief is well-grounded in law and fact, as set forth in the 
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attached memorandum.  This motion is based on the Declarations of Robert F. Lopez and Daniel L. 
Warshaw submitted herewith, with exhibits; the Declaration of Alan Vasquez, a representative of 
the proposed Settlement Administrator, with exhibits; the attached memorandum in support of 
Plaintiffs’ motion; the pleadings and papers on file in this action; and the oral argument of counsel, 
if any, presented at the hearing on this motion. 
Dated: January 22, 2016. 
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP 
 
 
By  /s/ Steve W. Berman     
Steve W. Berman 
Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice) 
Robert F. Lopez (pro hac vice) 
1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 
Seattle, WA  98101 
Telephone:  (206) 623-7292 
Facsimile:   (206) 623-0594 
steve@hbsslaw.com 
robl@hbsslaw.com 
 
PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP 
 
 
By  /s/ Daniel L. Warshaw    
 Daniel L. Warshaw 
Bruce L. Simon (96241) 
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2450 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Telephone: (415) 433-9000 
Facsimile: (415) 433-9008 
bsimon@pswlaw.com 
Clifford H. Pearson (108523) 
Daniel L. Warshaw (185365) 
      15165 Ventura Blvd., Suite 400 
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 
Telephone: (818) 788-8300 
Facsimile:  (818) 788-8014 
cpearson@pswlaw.com 
dwarshaw@pswlaw.com 
 
Counsel for Select Plaintiffs and 
Interim Co-Lead Counsel for the Proposed Class 
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J. Paul Gignac 
FOLEY, BEZEK, BEHLE & CURTIS, LLP 
15 W. Carrillo Street, Suite 200 
Santa Barbara, CA 93101 
Telephone:  (805) 962-9495 
Facsimile:  (805) 962-0722 
jpg@foleybezek.com 
 
Rosemary M. Rivas 
FINKELSTEIN THOMPSON LLP 
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 300 
San Francisco, California 94111 
Telephone: (415) 398-8700 
Facsimile: (415) 398-8704 
rrivas@finkelsteinthompson.com 
 
Paul R. Kiesel 
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 Members for the Proposed Class 
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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This matter concerns Carrier iQ Software, a product that millions of U.S. mobile devices 
have borne over the years.  Some, including the Defendants in this case, tout its abilities to aid 
wireless carriers in providing better service to their customers by, for example, helping to 
determine the cause of dropped calls.  But to consumers’ surprise and dismay, based on video-
taped demonstrations and news reports in the technical and mainstream press that broke toward the 
end of 2011, the software seemed also to enable the interception and unauthorized re-transmittal of 
private electronic communications and data to unintended recipients.  Following the dissemination 
of these demonstrations and reports, consumers with Carrier iQ-equipped mobile phones filed 70-
plus lawsuits, including against the Defendants, in courts around the country.  These suits 
ultimately were consolidated by the J.P.M.L. for coordinated pretrial proceedings before this Court.   
Throughout the pendency of this case, the Defendants have adamantly denied liability, 
variously arguing that the software at issue is benign; that Plaintiffs misunderstood what they were 
seeing; that Plaintiffs authorized use of the software; and that in other instances, certain activity 
was inadvertent (and therefore unactionable) and had caused no harm.  The Defendants also 
contended that in any event, Plaintiffs could not sue them in court because of arbitration provisions 
in the Plaintiffs’ contracts with their wireless carriers that the Defendants claimed the right to 
invoke.   
Since consolidation, the Parties have litigated this matter vigorously, and now, following 
intense and lengthy negotiations, including five all-day, in-person mediation sessions, the Parties 
have reached a nationwide Settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims.  The Parties’ hard-fought Agreement, 
which includes a $9 million cash component, provides qualified Class Members presumptively 
with pro-rated cash awards via a simple claims process, or, if the Settlement fund is over-
subscribed, donations to established guardians of privacy interests for the benefit of Class 
Members.  It also provides for injunctive relief that Defendant Carrier iQ, Inc. implemented prior 
to the recent acquisition of its assets by AT&T Mobility IP, LLC. 
Regarding notice, the Parties have agreed to a strong, multi-faceted publication program 
constructed with expert assistance for maximum reach.  The Notice Program, designed to effect the 
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best notice practicable under the circumstances, includes print and intensive, targeted Internet 
advertising components; a dedicated Settlement website; references to that website on the websites 
of proposed Class Counsel; and a joint press release.  As such, it comports with the law and due 
process.   
As Plaintiffs demonstrate below, the Parties’ Settlement is worthy of the Court’s assent.  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for: preliminary approval of the Parties’ compromise 
Agreement; provisional certification of the requested nationwide Settlement Class, appointment of 
the Named Plaintiffs as class representatives, and appointment of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro 
LLP and Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP as Class Counsel; approval of the Parties’ Notice 
Program and an order directing notice accordingly; approval of Gilardi & Co. LLP as Settlement 
Administrator, whose duties shall include, inter alia, the provision of notice as directed; approval 
of the Parties’ proposed claim form, and approval of the procedures set forth in the Settlement 
Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from the Settlement Class, 
and, if any so choose, to object to the Settlement; and a schedule for the final approval process and 
for Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
Should the Court preliminarily approve the Parties’ nationwide settlement, which followed 
key discovery, expert consultation, litigation, and intense negotiations, including five in-person 
mediations in which the Parties were represented by well-experienced counsel and aided by a retired 
federal magistrate judge, the Hon. James Larson, and which provides to a nationwide class valuable 
monetary and injunctive benefits following implementation of a comprehensive Notice Program?   
Further, should the Court provisionally certify a Settlement Class so that notice of the 
Settlement may be given to Class Members; should it order notice as proposed by the Parties; 
should it provisionally appoint the Named Plaintiffs as class representatives; should it provisionally 
appoint the Hagens Berman and Pearson Simon Warshaw firms as Class Counsel; should it 
approve Gilardi & Co. LLP as Settlement Administrator, whose duties include the provision of 
notice; should it approve the Parties’ proposed Claim Form, and approve of the procedures set forth 
in the Settlement Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from the 
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Settlement Class, and, if any so choose, to object to the Settlement; and should it schedule a 
hearing on the question of final approval of the Parties’ Settlement as well as a motion for recovery 
of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses? 
III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Background facts 
In November 2011 news broke in the technical and mainstream press regarding the 
presence of Carrier iQ software and its apparent activity on mobile devices.  (Second Consolidated 
Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 291) (“SCAC”),1 ¶ 40.)  These reports centered on research and 
Internet videos published by an independent security researcher named Trevor Eckhart.  (Id., ¶ 41.)  
Mr. Eckhart’s YouTube video, which to-date has received over 2 million views, focused on his 
HTC mobile telephone.  (Id., ¶ 46.)  His video appeared to show troubling activity associated with 
Carrier iQ Software on his device, including the interception and logging of SMS text message 
content and Internet search terms, among other communications.  (Id.)   
Concerns arose that the content of consumers’ private electronic communications was being 
captured and transmitted off users’ devices to unintended third-party recipients.  (Id., ¶ 47.)  Soon 
Congress, particularly U.S. Sen. Al Franken, became involved.  (Id., ¶ 48.)  On December 1, 2011, 
Sen. Franken sent letters to Carrier iQ, certain wireless carriers, and three of the device 
manufacturers that are Defendants here.  (Id.)  All had responded by the end of that year, providing 
more insight into the design and workings of Carrier iQ Software.  (Id., ¶¶ 52-60.)    
B. Plaintiffs’ claims 
By the end of 2011, consumers around the country had filed 70-plus proposed class-action 
suits, in multiple jurisdictions, against Carrier iQ and several device manufacturers.  In April 2012 
                                                 
1
 Citations in this motion are largely to Plaintiffs’ SCAC.  On January 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed 
their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, which, as permitted by the Court in its order on 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 339 (“MTD Order”), includes an amended Federal 
Wiretap Act (sometimes “FWA”) claim.  As Plaintiffs have advised Defendants, they did not at 
this time amend or re-plead in the other manners permitted by the Court’s MTD Order, or to 
account for other claims dismissed with or without prejudice in that order.  If Plaintiffs’ Settlement 
with the Defendants is not finally approved, or if it is otherwise terminated, respectfully, Plaintiffs 
will submit a further amended complaint taking into account all aspects of the Court’s MTD Order, 
including other claims dismissed and the Court’s leave to amend and re-plead as specified therein. 
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the J.P.M.L. consolidated all of the federal suits in the Northern District of California and appointed 
the Hon. Edward M. Chen as the MDL judge.  In August 2012, Plaintiffs in the MDL proceedings, 
who hail from 13 states, filed their First Consolidated Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 107, alleging 
six counts against the instant Defendants.  They dropped one of these counts in their June 2014 
Second Consolidated Amended Complaint.  (Dkt. No. 291.)  And, earlier on the date of the instant 
motion, Plaintiffs filed their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, in which they amend and re-
assert their Federal Wiretap Act claim against the Manufacturer Defendants.
2
  The Court had 
dismissed this claim without prejudice in January 2015, as discussed below.  (See MTD Order at 41-
45.) 
C. Proceedings to-date 
Following the filing of Plaintiffs’ FCAC, the Parties exchanged initial disclosures in 
September 2012. 
Thereafter, in November 2012, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration.  (Dkt. No. 
129.)  Each Defendant (except for Motorola) sought to invoke the arbitration provisions in 
Plaintiffs’ contracts with their wireless carriers AT&T, Cricket, and Sprint on a theory of equitable 
estoppel.  (See generally id.) 
The Court allowed arbitration-related discovery, which was contentious but productive.  In 
addition to serving discovery on all moving Defendants, Plaintiffs sought discovery from their 
wireless carriers, as well as from Google.  (See Declaration of Robert F. Lopez in Support of Motion 
for Preliminary Approval (“Lopez Decl.”), ¶ 4.)  Discovery proceedings involved motions to compel 
and follow-up efforts, including a detail-oriented, in-person meeting among counsel for all the 
Parties, designed to lessen the claimed undue burden on Defendants and third-parties.  (Id., ¶ 5.)  
Ultimately, all targets produced material to the Plaintiffs, the total of which was voluminous, and 
counsel reviewed and analyzed it with advice from their consultants.  (Id.) 
                                                 
2
 See n.1, supra.   
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In February 2014, following the completion of arbitration-related discovery, briefing on 
Defendants’ motion was completed.  Following a lengthy and in-depth hearing, the Court, on 
March 28, 2014, denied Defendants’ motion.  (Dkt. No. 251.)   
On April 28, 2014, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal with respect to the order denying their 
motion to compel arbitration.  (Dkt. No. 261.)  Defendants then moved the Court for a stay pending 
disposition of their appeal.  Following briefing and a hearing, the Court on June 13, 2014, denied 
Defendants’ motion to stay without prejudice.  (Dkt. No. 285.)  In January 2015, Defendants-
Appellants filed their 80-page opening brief.  Further briefing on their appeal has been delayed by 
agreement of the Parties pending the outcome of mediation and other settlement negotiations, but the 
appeal remains pending.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 6.) 
Following denial of their motion to stay, all Defendants in July 2014 moved to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ SCAC in its entirety.  (Dkt. No. 304.)  Briefing was completed in early September 2014, 
Dkt. Nos. 309 and 311, and a hearing was held later that month.  In January 2015, the Court issued 
its order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion.  (See generally MTD Order.) 
Thereafter, the Parties agreed to private mediation.  In advance of mediation, the Court 
permitted Plaintiffs ADR-related discovery.  Plaintiffs propounded written discovery to all 
Defendants, and Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed and analyzed the answers and material that 
Defendants produced.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 7.) 
In sum, during the pendency of this case, Interim Co-Lead Counsel have conferred with 
consulting experts; conducted extensive factual and legal research; and reviewed and analyzed 
discovery answers and responses, and documents, produced by the Defendants and by non-parties 
Google, AT&T Mobility, Cricket, and Sprint.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 8; Declaration of Daniel L. 
Warshaw in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Warshaw Decl.”), ¶ 4.)  
 Additionally, Interim Co-Lead Counsel requested, and Defendant Carrier iQ provided, 
information regarding Carrier iQ’s financial condition and its ability to satisfy a judgment in this 
case, as well as its ability to contribute funds to settle this matter.  Interim Co-Lead Counsel 
reviewed and analyzed the financial data provided by Carrier iQ as part of the process of reaching 
the instant settlement.  (Lopez Decl.,  ¶ 9.)  
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D. The Settlement 
1. Mediation 
The Parties agreed to JAMS mediation before the Hon. James Larson (U.S.M.J. Ret.).  The 
first all-day mediation occurred in San Francisco on November 12, 2014.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 10.)  
Four more all-day sessions occurred in San Francisco on December 16, 2014; March 17, 2015; 
April 27, 2015; and September 28, 2015.  (Id.)  These sessions were conducted with the aid of 
mediation briefing prepared by the Parties, including briefing and analyses submitted on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs, which was prepared by Interim Co-Lead Counsel.  (Id.)  Each mediation session was 
contentious,and several went well beyond eight hours.  (Id., ¶ 11.)  Both sides held their ground, 
with all Parties strongly insisting on the righteousness of their positions.  (Id.)  The Parties 
continued their negotiations following each session, sometimes with the aid of Judge Larson.  (Id.) 
2. Settlement class definition, class period, and claims period 
Plaintiffs first reached terms of a proposed nationwide settlement with Defendant Carrier 
iQ, and those Parties notified the Court of their agreement on November 3, 2014.  (Dkt. No. 322.)   
Plaintiffs and the remaining Defendants reached broad agreement on a proposed nationwide 
settlement at their September 28, 2015, mediation session.  They advised the Court of their 
agreement on October 8, 2015.  (Dkt. No. 391.) 
The Parties’ Agreement defines the Settlement Class as follows: 
All persons in the United States who, during the Class Period, purchased, owned, or 
were an Authorized User of, any Covered Mobile Device.
3
 
                                                 
3
 The Settlement Class definition in the Settlement Agreement differs slightly from the class 
definition in the SCAC because it includes Authorized Users, i.e., users such as Plaintiffs Laning, 
Phong, and Sandstrom, who, according to records submitted by Defendants in support of their 
motion to compel arbitration, owned Carrier IQ-equipped mobile phones they were specifically 
authorized to use on someone else’s account.  (See Dkt. Nos. 132 (Cummings Decl.), ¶ 9 
(addressing Plaintiff Laning) and 132-4 at 3; Dkt. No. 135 (Miller Decl.), ¶¶ 111-15 (addressing 
Plaintiff Phong); Dkt. Nos. 135 (Miller Decl.), ¶¶ 35-39 (addressing Plaintiff Sandstrom) and 135-
15.)  The Agreement defines “Authorized User” as “a person authorized by name on the Wireless 
Provider account for a Covered Mobile Device during the class period.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 2.d.)  
Also, the Settlement Class definition in the Settlement Agreement does not explicitly reference the 
embedded or pre-load methods of installation of Carrier IQ Software, cf. SCAC, ¶ 86, because 
Class Members with both types of installation are eligible for relief under the Settlement.    
The Settlement Class definition in the TCAC squares with the Settlement Class definition in the 
Parties’ Settlement Agreement.  
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(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 2.oo.)  The Class Period is defined as “that period of time between 
December 1, 2007 and the date of entry of the Court’s order granting preliminary approval of the 
Settlement.”  (Id., ¶ 2.o.)  The Agreement defines an Authorized User as “a person authorized by 
name on the Wireless Provider account for a Covered Mobile Device during the Class Period.”4  
(Id., ¶ 2.d.)   
The Claims Period is defined as “that period of time that expires 60 days from the date of 
Class Notice.”  (Id., ¶ 2.i.) 
3. Relief to the settlement class 
Based on discovery and analysis, Plaintiffs estimate the nationwide settlement class to 
consist of some 79 million members.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 12.)  The Settlement provides for a Gross 
Settlement Fund of $9 million in monetary relief to the proposed settlement class.  (Id., ¶ 13.)  
Additionally, Carrier iQ agreed, prior to the acquisition of its assets by AT&T Mobility IP, LLC, to 
provide certain injunctive relief to the proposed class.  (Id.; Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶¶ 18-21.)  As part 
of the Settlement Agreement, Carrier iQ warrants that it performed as agreed prior to the asset sale. 
(Id., ¶¶ 18 and 67.b.) 
 Interim Co-Lead Counsel, in consultation with Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, endorse 
the value of this settlement.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 14; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.)  So do all Named Plaintiffs.  
(Lopez Decl., ¶ 14; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.)   
The Settlement Agreement provides that proceeds payable to the class are net of: the cost of 
notice and administration; service awards to 17 Named Plaintiffs and one former Named Plaintiff 
(if approved); attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as specified (if approved); and any taxes.   
(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶¶ 25-27.)  Service awards and attorneys’ fees and costs are discussed at Sec. 
D.5 of this memorandum, infra. 
                                                 
4
 “Wireless Provider” means “AT&T Mobility, Cricket, Sprint, or T-Mobile.”  (Id., ¶ 2.qq.)  
“Covered Mobile Device” means “a telephone or tablet manufactured or marketed by any 
Manufacturer Defendant that was equipped with Carrier IQ software at the time of sale to end users 
of the Covered Mobile Device.”  (Id., ¶ 2.q.)   
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With respect to the funds directly available to Class Members, the proposed Settlement is 
claims-made in nature.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 28.)  Class members may submit claims during the 
Claims Period for a pro-rated share of the Net Settlement Fund.  (Id.)   
The Agreement provides that in the event the Net Settlement Fund is subscribed to the point 
that qualified class-member claimants would receive less than approximately $4 per claimant, then, 
after consultation among the Class Counsel and Defendants’ counsel, and after notice to, and 
approval by, the Court, the entire Net Settlement Fund shall be donated in three equal shares to 
three cy pres recipients with national reach and reputations – the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(“EFF”), the Center for Democracy and Technology, and CyLab Usable Privacy and Security 
Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University
5
 – each of which is an established guardian of, and 
advocate for, consumer privacy interests such as those at stake in this litigation.  (Id., ¶ 28; see also 
Lopez Decl. Ex. B.)  Notably, the EFF was involved in this matter from the outset; its counsel 
represented Mr. Eckhart early on, and it did much work to help consumers, i.e., the proposed class, 
understand Carrier iQ Software.  (See SCAC, ¶¶ 43-45.)  
The Agreement also provides that in the event the Net Settlement Fund is not over-
subscribed, then any leftover funds following payments to qualified claimants (e.g., the value of 
uncashed checks), will be split among those three cy pres recipients.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 32.)   
4. Notice, opt-out procedures, and release 
The Parties’ settlement provides for robust notice.  (Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8; Declaration of 
Alan Vasquez Regarding Dissemination of Notice (“Vasquez Decl.”), ¶¶ 13-28 and Ex. 4.)  Given 
the size of the class; the fact that the Parties do not have access to direct contact information for 
Class Members; the inability to obtain direct confirmation; and the projected cost to notify Class 
Members directly even if direct contact information were available, the notice program upon which 
the Parties have agreed, with expert assistance and endorsement, not only comports with due 
process but is the best notice practicable under the circumstances.  (Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) 
                                                 
5
 The Parties have not discussed the possibility of cy pres donations with any of these three 
potential recipients, nor do the Parties suggest that any of these three potential recipients endorse 
their Settlement. 
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The proposed Notice Program calls for intensive Internet notice via banner ads and search-
related advertising, all selected and administered in consultation with Class Counsel by an expert 
notice provider, Gilardi & Co. LLC, which the Parties propose as overall Settlement Administrator.  
(Lopez Decl. Ex. A at Ex. B thereto; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7.)  Further, the Settlement Administrator 
will establish a Settlement website, where notice of the Settlement and key documents will be 
available, including the long- and short-form notices.  (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7; Vasquez Decl., ¶ 27 
and Ex. 4.)  Class counsel’s websites will include links to this website.  (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7; 
Vasquez Decl., ¶ 27.)  Also, the Parties will issue a joint press release advising of the Settlement.  
(Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7; Vasquez Decl., ¶ 26 and Ex. 8.)   
To reiterate, costs of notice will be paid from the $9 million Gross Settlement Fund.  Prior 
to the Final Approval Hearing, the Settlement Administrator will file an affidavit confirming that 
notice has been provided as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and ordered by the Court.  
(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 38.) 
The long-form notice describes the material terms of the Settlement and the procedures that 
Class Members must follow in order to receive Settlement benefits.  (Vasquez Decl. Ex. 4 at 3-4.)  
The notice also describes the procedures for Class Members to exclude themselves from the 
Settlement or to provide comments in support of or in objection to it.  (Id. at 4-5.)  Any Class 
Member who wishes to be excluded from the Settlement need only opt-out by making a timely 
request.  (Id.)  The procedures for opting-out are those commonly used in class-action settlements; 
they are straightforward and plainly described in the class notice.  The short-form notice provides a 
summary of the foregoing.  (Id. Ex. 4 (including short- and long-form notices).)  Additionally, the 
Settlement Agreement provides that if opt-outs exceed a confidential number, then any Defendant, 
with the agreement of two other Defendants, will have the option to terminate the Settlement or to 
continue under it with no variations to its terms.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 51.) 
If the Court grants final approval of the Settlement following notice, and after the period for 
opt-out requests and objections expires, then all Class Members who have not excluded themselves 
from the Settlement Class will be deemed to have released all covered claims, as defined in the 
Settlement Agreement, against all Defendants.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 53.)    
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5. Service awards and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses 
The Parties have agreed that each Named Plaintiff (and one former Named Plaintiff) will 
receive, if Plaintiffs’ request is approved by the Court, an award of no more than $5,000 for his or 
her service in this matter.  (Id., ¶ 36.)  Named Plaintiffs variously have assisted counsel with the 
preparation of complaints in this matter; have consulted with counsel at various times throughout 
the pendency of this case; have monitored the proceedings on their own behalf and on behalf of the 
putative class; and have worked with counsel to prepare, review, and submit declarations in support 
of their claims and those of the proposed class.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 15.)  In addition, each worked with 
Plaintiffs’ counsel in preparing initial disclosures.  (Id.)  Various Named Plaintiffs also have 
consulted on more than one occasion with Interim Co-Lead Counsel, with Executive Committee 
counsel, or with their own counsel (as requested by Interim Co-Lead Counsel) regarding the 
proposed terms of the settlement.  (Id.)  Finally, with respect to relief, none of the Plaintiffs will 
receive anything more from this Settlement than any other Class Member.  Instead, he or she will 
only be entitled to the same relief, subject to the same conditions, as any other Class Member.  (Id.)   
As for Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, the Parties addressed the recovery of 
these following negotiation of the substantive terms of the proposed class Settlement.  (Id., ¶ 16.)  
Regarding attorneys’ fees specifically, the Parties have agreed that proposed Class Counsel may 
request (and distribute) the Ninth Circuit benchmark of 25% of the Net Settlement Fund by way of 
a separate motion to be filed prior to the Final Approval Hearing.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 37.)   
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court should grant preliminary approval of the Parties’ negotiated Settlement. 
Settlements are to be encouraged in class-action lawsuits.  The Court, however, must 
approve class settlements for them to become effective, and in so doing, it examines “whether a 
proposed settlement is ‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.’”  Burden v. SelectQuote Ins. 
Servs., 2013 WL 1190634, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013) (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 
938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988))); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).  Approval of a class-action settlement proceeds through two stages: 
preliminary approval and final approval (with notice in-between).  Because the settlement in this 
Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC   Document 403   Filed 01/22/16   Page 19 of 35
 NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL – 11 
Case No. C-12-md-2330-EMC 
010285-11  843367 V1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
matter passes the standards set for this first step in the approval process, Plaintiffs ask the Court to 
grant their request for preliminary approval.  
By way of this motion, Plaintiffs respectfully urge that the Court take the first step in the 
approval process and preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement. 
1. Negotiated class-action settlements are desirable. 
Negotiated settlements like the instant one are to be encouraged.  As the Ninth Circuit has 
stated, “there is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation.  This is particularly 
true in class action suits….”  Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976)); see also Churchill Village, 
L.L.C. v. GE, 361 F.3d 566, 576 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 
(9th Cir. 1995).  Settlement is desirable in class action suits because they are “an ever increasing 
burden to so many federal courts and [] frequently present serious problems of management and 
expense.”  Van Bronkhorst, 529 F.2d at 950. 
Additionally, courts should give “proper deference” to negotiated compromises.  “[T]he 
court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the 
parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the 
agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating 
parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.”  
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (quotations omitted); see also Chavez v. WIS Holding Corp., 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 56138, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (“The Court gives weight to the parties’ 
judgment that the settlement is fair and reasonable.”) (citing In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 
373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
2. The Settlement meets the standards for preliminary approval. 
The first step toward effecting a proposed class-wide settlement is preliminary approval.  
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.14, at 173 (4th ed. 2004)
6
 (“This [approval of a 
settlement] usually involves a two-stage procedure.  First, the judge reviews the proposal 
                                                 
6
 Hereafter, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. 
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preliminarily to determine whether it is sufficient to warrant public notice and a hearing.  If so, the 
ﬁnal decision on approval is made after the hearing.”); see also id., § 21.632, at 320 (“Review of a 
proposed class action settlement generally involves two hearings.  First, counsel submit the 
proposed terms of settlement and the judge makes a preliminary fairness evaluation….”) (footnote 
omitted); Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25, at 38-39 (4th ed. 
2002) (discussing the two-step approval process).   
At the preliminary approval stage, the Court asks whether “‘[1] the proposed settlement 
appears to be the product of serious, informed, noncollusive negotiations, [2] has no obvious 
deficiencies, [3] does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or 
segments of the class, and [4] falls within the range of possible approval
[7]….’”  See, e.g., Burden, 
2013 WL 1190634, at *3 (citing In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007)).  Put another way, the Court should “make a preliminary determination of the fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms ….”  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. 
§ 21.632.   
Because a preliminary evaluation of the instant Settlement will reveal no “grounds to doubt 
its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class 
representatives or segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys,” and because the 
settlement “appears to fall within the range of possible approval,” Plaintiffs submit that the 
settlement passes this initial evaluation.  See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25; see also In re 
Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80.  Accordingly, as demonstrated below, the 
Court should grant preliminary approval.   
                                                 
7
 Where, as here, the settlement was attained via “arms-length negotiations,” following 
“meaningful discovery,” in which the Parties were represented by “experienced, capable” counsel, 
the Court may afford to it “a presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness.”  See, e.g., 
Arnold v. Arizona Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2006 WL 2168637, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2006) (citing 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2005); NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 11.41, at 90 (“There is usually a presumption of fairness when a proposed class 
settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s length by counsel for the class, is presented for 
approval.”). 
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a. The Settlement is the product of well-informed, vigorous, and thorough 
arms’-length negotiation. 
In contemplating preliminary approval, one of the Court’s duties is to ensure that “the 
agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating 
parties ….”  Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (internal quotes and citations omitted).  As set forth above, 
the settlement in this matter was achieved only after: consolidation of 70-plus lawsuits and an 
investigation that resulted in Plaintiffs’ FCAC; key discovery, including arbitration-related 
discovery not only from the Defendants but from third-party wireless carriers and Google, followed 
later by ADR-related discovery; review and analysis of the documents, declarations, and 
interrogatory answers produced, including with the aid of consulting experts; and much negotiation 
with the aid of a retired federal magistrate judge, who conducted five all-day, in-person mediations 
and additional follow-up calls with the Parties.  (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 7-8; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 4.)  
Further, the Plaintiffs and proposed class in this matter were represented throughout by dedicated 
counsel, including Interim Co-Lead Counsel and Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee members with 
extensive experience in class-action and commercial litigation.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 17 and Ex. C; 
Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 9-15 and Ex. B.)   
Because of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ counsel were well-situated to evaluate the strength and 
weakness of Plaintiffs’ case.  Far from being the product of anything inappropriate, the Settlement 
at issue is the result of long, hard-fought, adversarial work, such that it is worthy of preliminary 
approval by the Court.  Cf. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (no basis to disturb settlement where there 
was no evidence suggesting that the settlement was negotiated in haste or in the absence of 
information).  
b. The Settlement bears no obvious deficiencies. 
Furthermore, the Settlement bears no obvious deficiencies.  See Burden, 2013 WL 
1190634, at *3.  There are no patent defects that would preclude its approval by the Court, such 
that notifying the class and proceeding to a formal fairness hearing would be a waste of time.  See 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25 (referring to the Court’s inquiry as to, inter alia, “obvious 
deficiencies”).  Respectfully, an examination of the Settlement will reveal no apparent unfairness, 
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and no “unduly preferential treatment of a class representative or segments of the Settlement Class, 
or excessive compensation for attorneys.”  See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 
WL 5055810, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2012) (“There are no grounds to doubt the fairness of the 
Settlement, or any other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of a class 
representative or segments of the Settlement Class, or excessive compensation for attorneys.”). 
To the contrary, the Settlement provides cash relief to qualified Class Members on a claims-
made, pro-rated basis.  (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 28.)  Under the Parties’ Agreement, there is no 
preferential treatment of Class Members or segments of the class.  (See id.)  All Class Members, 
including class representatives, are treated equally.
 8
  (Id.)  If, however, it becomes economically 
unfeasible to distribute cash to qualified Class Members, the Agreement provides that, upon notice 
to and after approval by the Court, funds will be distributed equally to three established cy pres 
beneficiaries with national reach (corresponding to the nationwide character of the proposed class), 
each of which has made advocating for consumer privacy in the electronic sphere a part of its 
mission.
9
  (Id.; Lopez Decl. Ex. B.)  As stated above, the proposed, contingent recipients would 
include the EFF, which at the outset of this controversy played a key and vigorous role in this 
matter on behalf of the very consumers who are proposed Class Members.  (SCAC, ¶¶ 43-45.)   
                                                 
8
 As for service awards of up to $5,000 for each of the Named Plaintiffs (and for one former 
Named Plaintiff), such awards are supported by precedent and also by the attention that these 
individuals have devoted to this matter, including, variously, by way of assisting with the drafting 
of complaints, helping to prepare initial disclosures, preparing declarations with counsel in 
opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration,  consulting with counsel during the course 
of this litigation, monitoring the course of this case, and consulting with counsel regarding 
proposed terms of settlement.  See, e.g., Chao v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 4421308, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (noting that $5,000 incentive awards to representative plaintiffs are 
“presumptively reasonable” in this judicial district) (citing Jacobs v. California State Auto. Ass’n 
Inter–Ins. Bureau, 2009 WL 3562871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009)).   
9
 As the Ninth Circuit has stated: 
The cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable 
portions of a class action settlement fund to the “next best” class of beneficiaries.  
Cy pres distributions must account for the nature of the plaintiffs’ law suit, the 
objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members, 
including their geographic diversity.   
Nachsin v. A.O.L., LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 
F.2d at 1307-08)). 
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To reiterate, cy pres distributions would only be requested here if, due to the number of 
eligible claims, it would make no economic sense to distribute funds directly to Class Members.  
Then the Net Settlement Fund would be distributed to institutions with a proven track record and 
ability to advocate for the interests of consumers such as those who make up the proposed 
settlement class in this case.  (See Lopez Decl. Ex. B.)  Courts have recognized that the inability to 
award meaningful amounts in damages to class members justifies, in appropriate circumstances, 
the use of cy pres to further the interests of the class.  See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona 
Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (“when a class action 
involves a large number of class members but only a small individual recovery, the cost of 
separately proving and distributing each class member’s damages may so outweigh the potential 
recovery that the class action becomes unfeasible …. [C]y pres distribution avoids these 
difficulties ….  Federal courts have frequently approved this remedy in the settlement of class 
actions where the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or distribution of damages 
costly.”); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., 2013 WL 1120801, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) 
(granting final approval to class settlement, including as to cy pres component, where plaintiffs had 
“made a sufficient showing that the cost of distributing the settlement to the 62 million individual 
class members would exceed the size of the fund, thus making such a remedy cost-prohibitive and 
infeasible.”).10 
Finally, as for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs’ recovery is capped at 25% of the Gross Settlement 
Fund, i.e., at the Ninth Circuit’s benchmark for recovery in the class context.  Negotiations over 
attorneys’ fees were separate from, and took place after, negotiations regarding relief to the class.  
                                                 
10
 See also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2005) (“distribution 
would have resulted in the payment of literally pennies to each of the millions of individuals who 
would fall into the Looted Assets Class … [W]e have previously affirmed the District Court’s use 
of a cy pres remedy in this case”); Bebchick v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 
1963) (impossibility of individual refunds for train and bus tickets led to the creation of a fund to 
benefit transit riders); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (cy pres allocation of $2.5 million where administrative costs of distributing it would reduce 
payments to $2.00 per claimant); Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 569 (D.C. 2003) (in antitrust case 
concerning vitamin products, court approved a cy pres remedy only award to organizations 
promoting the health of District of Columbia residents where only $1 would have been available to 
each class member).   
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(Lopez Decl., ¶ 16.)  The percentage negotiated for fees is fair in light of the years spent by counsel 
on this matter, their experience, and the results achieved for the class.  (See id.)  In fact, it will 
result in a negative multiplier to lodestar.  (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 19.)   
c. The Settlement falls within the range of possible approval. 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Court should consider whether “the settlement, taken as 
a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.”  Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (internal 
quotes and citations omitted).  Still, the Court at this point does not conduct the fuller analysis that 
occurs upon the motion for final approval.  Chin v. RCN Corp., 2010 WL 1257583, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 12, 2010) (“In fact, ‘a full fairness analysis is neither feasible nor appropriate’ when 
evaluating a proposed settlement agreement for preliminary approval.”) (citation omitted).  Here, 
the Parties’ Settlement, which resulted in a $9 million Gross Settlement Fund in compromise of 
hotly contested claims, falls within the range of possible approval, such that preliminary approval 
is warranted.  (See Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) 
“To evaluate the ‘range of possible approval’ criterion, which focuses on ‘substantive 
fairness and adequacy,’ ‘courts primarily consider plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against 
the value of the settlement offer.’”  Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 
1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080).  In this 
case, while certain evidence pointed in Plaintiffs’ view to violations of federal and state 
wiretapping and privacy laws, violations of various states’ consumer fraud laws, and violation of 
the implied warranty of merchantability, Plaintiffs’ success was not without doubt.  (Lopez Decl., 
¶ 18.)   
For example, the Plaintiffs faced another motion to dismiss with respect to the TCAC, 
including as to their re-pled FWA claim against the Manufacturer Defendants.  (Id.)  Also, had this 
Settlement not occurred, Plaintiffs would have amended as otherwise permitted by the Court, and 
Plaintiffs almost certainly would have a further motion to dismiss as to most, if not all, of these re-
pled claims as well.  (Id.)  The Defendants would continue to have contested liability and damages, 
and Plaintiffs had to take into account the financial condition of Defendant Carrier iQ.  (Id.)  
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Additionally, the Defendants promised to contest class certification on grounds that Plaintiffs 
necessarily took seriously.  (Id.)  Further, Plaintiffs faced Defendants’ pending appeal.  (Id.) 
Still, at every stage of this case, Plaintiffs have pushed back, reminding the Defendants of 
the strength of their own positions.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 19.)  But ultimately, after taking into account 
the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation, see Burden, 2013 WL 
1190634, at *3 (citation omitted), Plaintiffs and their experienced counsel, with the aid of Judge 
Larson, were able to achieve a settlement that allows for substantial monetary and injunctive relief 
to the Settlement Class.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 19.)   
With respect to the monetary component of the Settlement, $9 million is substantial in light 
of the above-stated risks, together with the risk that, ultimately, a jury could find no liability or 
award no damages, or less in damages, should the case have proceeded to trial.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 20; 
Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.)  As for the non-monetary relief achieved, it included significant alterations to 
the Carrier iQ Software, as well as changes to the porting guide to help prevent a debug error such 
as that whose effects Mr. Eckhart pointed to in his widely seen video.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 20 and Ex. 
A, ¶¶ 18-21.)   
In sum, the Settlement at bar falls within the range of possible approval.  For this reason, 
too, the Court should grant preliminary approval. 
B. The proposed class should be certified for settlement purposes. 
The Court has not yet granted class certification in this matter.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask 
that the Court certify provisionally a nationwide class for settlement purposes.  Provisional 
certification will permit notice of the proposed class to be issued to the class.  Such notice will 
inform Class Members of the existence and terms of the Settlement Agreement, of their right to be 
heard regarding its fairness, of their right to opt-out, and of the date, time, and place of the fairness 
hearing.  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. §§ 21.632, 21.633.  Here, where the Defendants have 
waived their challenges to class certification for purposes of the Parties’ Settlement, Hanlon 
provides the roadmap for the Court’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ request. 
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1. The proposed class meets the Amchem requirements for certification of a 
settlement class. 
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997), the Supreme Court of the 
United States confirmed the propriety, and recognized the necessity, of Settlement Class 
certification in matters such as this one, where Class Members are identifiable, and where there are 
relatively small economic damages.  As the court put it:  
[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the 
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to 
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.  A class action solves this problem 
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor. 
Id. at 617 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
Here, there is one underlying type of product at issue – software, an alleged course of 
conduct common to all Class Members, and only economic damages at stake; thus, this is the kind 
of class action endorsed in Amchem.  Without this class action and settlement, most Class Members 
would be “without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”  Id.  In a situation 
such as this, where the proposed class seeks only economic damages (as distinct a class or classes 
seeking individualized personal injury and future-injury damages), class certification is eminently 
proper.  E.g., Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-23. 
2. The Rule 23(a) requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy are met. 
In order to merit class certification, Plaintiffs must show at the outset that the class is so 
numerous that joinder is impracticable; questions of law or fact are common to the class; the claims 
of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; and the proposed class 
representatives will protect the interests of the class fairly and adequately.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  
Plaintiffs meet these prerequisites.   
a. Numerosity 
Based on discovery, there may be some 79 million Class Members.  (Lopez Decl., ¶ 12.)  
On the basis of these numbers alone, “joinder of all members is impracticable.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(1).  Given these large numbers, the requirement of numerosity is easily satisfied here.  See, 
e.g., Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 869 (9th 
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Cir. 2002) (noting that numerosity requirement has been satisfied in cases involving 39 class 
members); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.5 (“In light of prevailing precedent, the difficulty 
inherent in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is 
impracticable, and the plaintiff whose class is that large or larger should meet the test of Rule 
23(a)(1) on that fact alone.”). 
b. Commonality 
As one court summarized recently: 
Commonality requires the existence of questions of law or fact that are common to 
the class.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  Commonality focuses on the relationship of 
common facts and legal issues among class members.  See, e.g., 1 William B. 
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:19 (5th ed. 2011).  Courts construe this 
requirement permissively.  Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 
1988).  “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.  The 
existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a 
common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the 
class.”  Id.  In fact, it only takes one common question of fact or law shared between 
proposed class members to satisfy commonality.  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.   
Marilley v. Bonham, 2012 WL 851182, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012).  The requirement of 
commonality is satisfied by Plaintiffs’ allegations. 
Among the common questions raised are whether the Defendants violated the Federal 
Wiretap Act and various state privacy laws via the Carrier iQ software installed on Plaintiffs’ and 
proposed Class Members’ mobile devices; whether the Defendants violated state consumer fraud 
laws in the marketing and sale of mobile devices onto which Carrier iQ software was installed; and 
whether any defect or defects in the Defendants’ products caused breaches of the implied warranty 
of merchantability.  (SCAC, ¶¶ 89.)  The Ninth Circuit cited a list of common questions including 
ones similar to these in Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2005), where it 
found commonality.  Plaintiffs have identified numerous questions of law and fact common to the 
class, such that the requirement of commonality is met. 
c. Typicality 
Typicality is met as well.  Indeed, a finding of commonality ordinarily will satisfy the 
requirement of typicality, too.  Barefield v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1987 WL 65054, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 9, 1987). 
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Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties be 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”  []  “The purpose of the typicality 
requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the 
interests of the class.”  Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 408 (9th Cir. 
1992).   
Burden, 2013 WL 1190634, at *5 (citation omitted).  Here, the interests of the Named Plaintiffs 
and Class Members align neatly. 
Plaintiffs have the same claims as members of the class they seek to represent, and they 
must satisfy the same legal elements that Class Members must satisfy, including with respect to 
their FWA claims as amended and re-pled in the TCAC.  (See TCAC, ¶¶ 93-103.)  They share 
identical legal theories with putative Class Members, based on allegations that the Defendants 
marketed and sold products that breached their privacy and that bore defects as identified by the 
Plaintiffs.  (SCAC, ¶¶ 61-74.)  Their injuries are the same, too; like others in the proposed class, 
Plaintiffs’ privacy was breached, or their data and communications left susceptible to breach, 
leading to Plaintiffs’ claims for statutory damages, and also, they overpaid for products that 
allegedly bore latent defects.  (SCAC, ¶¶ 69-71, 139.)  Thus, Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied. 
d. Adequacy 
Finally, it must be determined whether Plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  “In making this determination, courts must 
consider two questions:  ‘(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest 
with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action 
vigorously on behalf of the class?’”  Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1031 
(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  Plaintiffs meet this requirement as well. 
First, Plaintiffs’ claims are co-extensive with members of the putative class.  All have an 
identical interest in establishing the Defendants’ liability, and each has been injured in the same 
manner.  All assert the same legal claims, and all seek identical relief.  There is no conflict among 
them. 
Also, each Named Plaintiff has agreed to assume the responsibility of representing the 
class, and each has made him- or herself available to do so, including by way of assisting with the 
drafting of complaints, helping to prepare initial disclosures, preparing declarations with counsel in 
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opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration,  consulting with counsel during the course 
of this litigation, monitoring the course of this case, and consulting with counsel regarding 
proposed terms of settlement.  (See Lopez Decl., ¶ 15.)   
Second, as discussed and referenced in the declarations of counsel and as illustrated in the 
resumes attached thereto, Plaintiffs’ lawyers, including Interim Co-Lead (and proposed class) 
counsel have extensive experience and expertise in prosecuting complex class actions, including 
commercial, consumer, and product defect actions.  (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 16-17 and Ex. C; Warshaw 
Decl., ¶¶ 9-15 and Ex. A.)  Counsel have pursued this litigation vigorously, and they remain 
committed to advancing and protecting the common interests of all members of the class.  (Lopez 
Decl., ¶ 17; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 19.)   
Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
11
 
3. Common questions predominate, and a class action is the superior method to 
adjudicate Class Members’ claims. 
Once the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) are satisfied, the Court must determine if one 
of the subparts of Rule 23(b) is also satisfied.  Here, Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied because questions 
common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, 
and the class action device provides the best method for the fair and efficient resolution of Class 
Members’ claims.  Furthermore, the Defendants do not oppose provisional class certification for 
the purpose of giving effect to the Parties’ Settlement.  When addressing the propriety of class 
certification, the Court should consider the fact that, in light of the Settlement, trial will now be 
unnecessary, such that the manageability of the class for trial purposes is not relevant to the Court’s 
inquiry.  E.g., Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021-23. 
a. Common questions predominate. 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires an examination of whether “questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ….”  
“When common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all 
                                                 
11
 And, for the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs ask that they be appointed class 
representatives for the requested class and that Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Pearson, 
Simon & Warshaw, LLP be appointed class counsel. 
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members of the class in a single adjudication,” class treatment is justified.  Local Joint Exec. Bd. of 
Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Even one issue of central importance to the case and common to all class member claims can cause 
class litigation to be appropriate.  Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (9th 
Cir. 1996).  Here, common questions predominate. 
Common questions include whether Defendants’ software is a device used to intercept 
communications in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act; whether the Defendants have violated the 
privacy acts of various states as alleged in the operative complaint; whether the devices on which 
the software is installed are defective, such that they violate the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
act and state warranty law as alleged in the complaint; and whether the Defendants, by way of the 
conduct alleged in the complaint, have violated the various state consumer fraud and protection 
acts identified in the complaint.
12
  (SCAC, ¶ 89; TCAC, ¶ 89.)  These numerous common questions 
at the heart of this matter predominate over any issues affecting only individuals.  Predominance is 
established. 
b. Class treatment is the superior method for adjudicating claims of 
members of the proposed Settlement Class.   
As for the requirement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) that the class action be “superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,” class treatment will 
facilitate the fair and efficient resolution of all putative Class Members’ claims.  Given that 
Plaintiffs are aware of millions of Class Members sharing common issues, the class device is the 
most efficient and fair means of adjudicating all these many claims.  Class treatment is far superior 
to thousands upon thousands of individual suits or piecemeal litigation; in this matter, it will fulfill 
its function of conserving scarce judicial resources and promoting the consistency of adjudication.  
Accordingly, the superiority aspect of Rule 23(b)(3) is readily met. 
                                                 
12
 These questions persist insofar as permitted by the Court in its MTD Order, and following 
Plaintiffs’ amendment of the complaint to assert a revised FWA claim, as allowed by the Court. 
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C. The Court should approve the proposed forms and methods of class notice. 
“Rule 23(e)(1)(B) requires the court to ‘direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise ….’”  
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.312, at 293.  In order to protect the rights of absent Class 
Members, the Court must direct the best notice practicable to Class Members.  See, e.g., Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 
174-75 (1974).   
Additionally, “Rule 23 … requires that individual notice in [opt-out] actions be given to 
class members who can be identified through reasonable efforts.  Those who cannot be readily 
identified must be given the ‘best notice practicable under the circumstances.’”  MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.311, at 287.  In this case, bearing in mind the large class size, Plaintiffs have 
consulted with a notice expert to devise an intensive and best-notice-practicable Notice Program 
including a strong Internet and print publication component to reach Class Members nationwide; a 
settlement website; and plans to disseminate a press release regarding the settlement.  (See Vasquez 
Decl., ¶¶ 17-31 and Exs. 5-8; Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)  Notice by publication is an acceptable 
method of providing notice where, as here,
13
 the identity of specific Class Members is not 
reasonably available, and where the class size is as large as it is here.  In re Tableware Antitrust 
Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.311); In re HP Laser 
Printer Litig., 2011 WL 3861703, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (approving a notice plan 
utilizing direct email notice, publication of the summary notice in print publications, banner 
advertisements on websites, and “providing a link on both notice forms to a settlement website”); 
Norflet v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (D. Conn. 2009) (approving a 
notice plan utilizing Internet banner advertisements). 
As for the settlement notice itself, it should:  
 define the class; 
  
 describe clearly the options open to class members and the deadlines for taking action;  
                                                 
13
 See Warshaw Decl., ¶ 8. 
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 describe the essential terms of the proposed settlement;  
 
 disclose any special benefits provided to the class representatives;  
 
 provide information regarding attorney fees;  
 
 indicate the time and the place of the hearing to consider approval of the settlement, and 
the method for objecting to or opting out of the settlement;  
 
 describe the method for objecting to or opting out of the settlement; 
 
 explain the procedures for allocating and distributing settlement funds and clearly set 
forth any variations among different categories of class members;  
 
 explain the basis for valuation of non-monetary benefits;  
 
 provide information that will enable class members to estimate their individual 
recoveries; and 
 
 prominently display the address and phone number of class counsel and how to make 
inquiries.   
 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.312, at 295 (citation omitted).  Here, the notice forms attached 
to the Parties’ Settlement satisfy these requirements.  (See Vasquez Decl. Ex. 4 (short- and long-
form notices).) 
The Notice Program and documents are designed to afford notice in a comprehensive and 
reasonable manner.  Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to approve them.   
D. The Court should set a schedule toward final approval of the Parties’ Settlement. 
If the Court grants preliminary approval and provisionally certifies the Settlement Class, 
respectfully, the Court then should set a schedule toward final approval of the Parties’ Settlement.  
The Plaintiffs request the following schedule, which is incorporated in the proposed order 
submitted with this motion: 
1. The Notice Program shall commence no later than thirty-five (35) days after the 
entry of this Order (“Class Notice Date”); 
2. Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses shall be filed no 
later than forty-five (45) days after the Class Notice Date; 
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3. Class Members shall have until sixty (60) days after the Class Notice Date to file 
claims, opt-out, or exclude themselves, to object to the Stipulation of Settlement and 
Release (“Stipulation”), or to respond to Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ 
fees, costs,  and expenses; 
4. Plaintiffs shall file their Motion for Final Approval no later than thirty-five (35) 
days before the Final Approval Hearing;   
5. Plaintiff shall reply to any objection to the Stipulation and/or Class Counsel’s 
application for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses no later than seven (7) days 
before the Final Approval Hearing; and 
6. The Final Approval Hearing shall be held on a date no earlier than 145 days from 
the date of the order granting preliminary approval. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs ask respectfully that the Court grant preliminary 
approval of the Parties’ Settlement and the further relief requested herein.   
Dated: January 22, 2016. 
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP 
 
 
By  /s/ Steve W. Berman     
Steve W. Berman 
Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice) 
Robert F. Lopez (pro hac vice) 
1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 
Seattle, WA  98101 
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By  /s/ Daniel L. Warshaw    
 Daniel L. Warshaw 
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44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2450 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Telephone: (415) 433-9000 
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Case 3:12-md-02330-EMC   Document 403   Filed 01/22/16   Page 34 of 35
 NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL – 26 
Case No. C-12-md-2330-EMC 
010285-11  843367 V1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Clifford H. Pearson (108523) 
Daniel L. Warshaw (185365) 
      15165 Ventura Blvd., Suite 400 
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 
Telephone: (818) 788-8300 
cpearson@pswlaw.com 
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